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PROPOSALS FOR A SECURITIES MARKET LAW FOR CANADA: A REVIEW

RALPH L. SIMMONDS

*

1. Introduction
Securities regulation in the Canadian federation is presently largely a matter of
provincial law. Federal corporations legislation, while containing provisions concerning insider trading and takeover bid controls, proxy solicitation rules, and
public filing of financial statement requirements, applies only to federally chartered
corporations. These include some of the most important "public" (in the English
sense) or "widely held" (in the American sense) corporations in the country; however, the majority of corporations in Canada are not federally, but provincially
chartered. Furthermore, there are a number of securities regulation areas that are
not covered by the federal provisions. Pre-eminent among these is "new issue" and
"sale from control block holdings" regulations, both of which were deliberately left
to the provinces [1]. Finally, the federal provisions do not provide for an administrative agency responsible for securities regulation and with discretionary powers
to discharge that responsibility [2].
In 1979 the Federal Government's Department of Consumer and Corporate
Affairs, which is responsible for administration of the federal corporations legislation, published its Proposalsfor a Securities Market Law for Canada [hereinafter
Proposals],a three-volume set of recommendations on the appropriate role of the
federal government in the regulation of the securities market. The Proposals,which
comprise a draft statute [3], explanatory commentary [4], and background papers
[5], represent the culmination of six years of study and work by the authors, the
consultants, and the other advisers. If they are enacted into legislation, the Canadian scene will be transformed. A federal administrative agency, the Canadian Securifles Commission (CSC), will be superimposed onto the existing pattern of provincial securities commissions. And, what is more, the CSC will administer a statutory
scheme as comprehensive and complex as that of the province of Ontario, which
currently has the most sophisticated and influential of the provincial securities regulation schemes.
The Proposals do, in fact, draw much of their inspiration from the Ontario
scheme [6]. They also draw extensively on the United States federal scheme of
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securities regulation, with its seven statutes and its intricate pattern of subordinate
implementing legislation. In addition, they are much influenced by the American
Law Institutes mammoth FederalSecurities Code [7], a work which restates, reorganizes, and revises the American federal scheme [8].
It is noteworthy that the Proposalsdo not necessarily represent the policies of
the present Canadian Government. Rather, they reflect the views of the authors and
are intended to serve "as a discussion document to facilitate the formulation by the
Government of Canada of its policy on the regulation of the Canadian securities
market" [9]. It follows, then, that even if the Proposals'thrust is acceptable to the
Government, the provisions themselves may be much transformed before they
reach the federal parliament. In fact, the initial provincial reaction to the Proposals
has been cool [10].
Notwithstanding this uncertainty, a basic understanding of the Proposals and
exploration of their particular strengths and weaknesses is valuable. It is of great
interest to see what might be and it is important to provide some of the comment
that the Proposalsmeant to excite. Furthermore, by virtue of the overall excellence
of the work that went into their drafting, and the resulting draft statute, the Proposals are likely to be a major influence on provincial securities regulation reform in
the 1980s.
At this point, one might ask why Canada has not had a federal scheme of securities regulation long before now. This is an interesting question, especially in light of
the experience, dating from the 1930s, of its southern neighbor, the United States
[11]. The answer appears to lie, in large part at least, in Canadian constitutional
history. Overall, the history has been one of hospitality to provincial legislative
schemes which date back to the period of the first state laws in the United States.
At the same time, the jurisprudence, at least until recently, has been much less
favorable to a comprehensive federal scheme [12].
The case for enacting a comprehensive federal scheme now is well put in the Proposals: it rests on the perceived national and international character of much of
Canada's securities markets. The existing mechanisms of cooperation between the
provinces have worked fairly well to facilitate the adaptation of their regulatory
schemes to this reality [13]. However, cooperation has not always been forthcoming. And there appear to be a number of important matters which even conjoint provincial power does not reach [14].
On that note the author will review the main constituents of the draft act. For
convenience, those constituents will be grouped under four categories: regulation of
issuers; provisions addressed to the markets in which their securities are traded;
enforcement provisions ancillary to these two; and administration of the act and its
coordination with existing provincial law. Since the major perspective from which
this review is written is that of the issuer concerned about the regulatory burden it
would face under the act, the most d6tailed treatment will be given to the provisions concerning regulation of issuers. This discussion will be subdivided into two
parts: (1) distributions and (2) continuous disclosure.
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2. Regulation of issuers
2.1. Distributions
The draft statute's provisions regulating distributions of securities apply only to
situations in which sales are made in two or more provinces. This limitation is not
constitutionally necessary, but it is designed to avoid the federal statute dictating
standards at odds with provincial standards for sales to a province's own residents.
This, in turn, is part of a larger scheme designed to advance coordination and cooperation, and to further the policy of enabling a province to establish a level of protection for its own investors where only they are directly affected.
Generally speaking, the draft statute sets up a system similar to that set up by
the provincial statutes. It mandates that any person who wishes to distribute a
security must first file a prospectus or a block distribution circular with the Commission.
Their contents are to be determined by CSC regulations. The registrant must
then obtain a receipt for the document from the Commission. In the case of a prospectus, the Commission is empowered to deny such a receipt if "the document
contains a misrepresentation or fails to disclose a material fact required [under the
statute]"; if "the distribution in connection with which it is filed is deceptive"; if
"an unconscionable consideration has been or is intended to be given for promotional purposes or for the acquisition of property"; if the proceeds of the distribution, together with the issuer's other resources, are insufficient "to accomplish the
purpose of the distribution stated in the prospectus"; if "the past conduct of the
issuer or of a person who exercises a determinative influence over its management
and policies indicates that the business of the issuer is likely to be conducted in a
manner that is not honest or financially responsible or that is unfair to its securityholders"; if "an expert who prepared or certified a part of the prospectus or a
report used in connection with it is not acceptable to the Commission"; or if "for
any other reason" the distribution is deemed by the Commission to be unfair, unjust, or inequitable [15]. In the case of a block distribution circular, only the first
two and the last two standards apply. Subject to any cause for disapproval, the
Commission is required to issue a receipt (signifying approval) within a reasonable
time after the document is filed with it. During the period between the time of
filing and the moment of approval the issuer may seek prospective purchasers by
means of a preliminary prospectus, or a tombstone or other advertisement, so long
as these meet standards estabiished by the Commission.
This system could make much more expensive what is already at the provincial
level a costly process that ultimately yields an often difficult-to-digest disclosure
document [16]. Recognizing this problem, the Proposals' commentary encourages
the Commission to process the prospectuses of seasoned issuers expeditiously. Both
the statute and the commentary exhort the Commission to cooperate with its provincial counterparts so as to prevent unnecessary and time-consuming duplication,
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and the statute allows the Commission to require that a disclosure document contain an introductory summary of its contents. In addition, the statute requires the
Commission to devise regulations that "enable reporting issuers to incorporate by
reference or omit information that has already been disclosed to the public or filed
with the Commission" [17]; the statute also leaves room for the development of
short-form prospectuses.
Defining the term "distribution" to include primarily new issues of securities
and sales of securities by controlling securityholders, the statute takes the additional significant step of also including a sale of previously issued securities from
out of the holdings of a so-called "sophisticated purchaser" or "prescribed group"
of other non-controlling persons, "if the aggregate number of securities exceeds an
amount prescribed by the Commission" [18]. In the third type of distribution, the
disclosure document required is to be called "the block distribution circular". It is
expected that the Commission will require less onerous disclosure for this document than it will for the prospectus required in the first two types of distribution.
The rationale for including sophisticated and other non-controlling persons within
the term "distribution" is that their substantial dispositions are likely to produce
the sort of market grooming and sales efforts against which the distribution regulatory scheme should protect. This position has much to commend it; but the Proposals clearly recognize that care must be taken to prevent the imposition of undue
liquidity restraints on large securityholders with the possible chilling effects that
such restraints could have on institutional purchases. The block distribution extension is inserted therefore as a tentative one.
The disclosure requirements apply to all persons who wish to sell or offer for
sale a security in the course of a distribution. This breadth of application makes the
exemptions to the distribution regulatory scheme in the statute most important.
The statute lists a large number of these and adds that other exemptions can be
specified by regulation, and that issuers can apply for exemption orders for particular transactions. The specific exemptions may be grouped under two major headings: (1) transactions for which investor protection is provided otherwise, because
of a pre-existing regulatory scheme, or because the investor can fend for himself, or
because the risk of loss is very low; and (2) transactions for which the cost of protection, in terms of impairment of other policy objectives, is deemed to outweigh
investor protection objectives. Exemptions in the first categgry include securities
exchange takeover bids which are covered by the takeover bid regulatory scheme;
situations in which banks purchase securities for their own investment; and trading
in debt securities of the Government of Canada. Exemptions in the second category
include situations in whichf the issuer issues its own or an affiliate's securities to its
employees.
Those exemptions likely to be of the greatest domestic interest are those applicable to small issuers. Under the old Ontario scheme, superseded in 1979 by the
present one, exemption was possible if a determination was made that the proposed
issue was so confined as not to be addressed "to the public" [19]. However, the
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interpretive question posed by use of this phrase proved to be as difficult in Canada
as it was in the United States. Taking its cue from Securities and Exchange Commission rulemaking attempts to clarify the definition, Ontario's new scheme, after
a transitional period ending in 1981, will seek to capture the flavor of the old law
while reducing its uncertainties. Thus, it will replace the limitation in coverage to
the "public" with an exemption for a limited offering to persons who have access
to and ability to use prospectus-quality information. The Proposals'draft statute
contains a similar limited offering exemption. However, it adds another such
exemption which eliminates the potentially troublesome purchaser qualifications.
This latter exemption, modeled after the ALI Code exemption, defines "limited
offering" as a "distribution within a period prescribed by the Commission to not
more than thirty-five purchasers of the securities distributed", where each purchaser agrees to file or have filed a prospectus if a sale of the securities by him
"results in there being more than thirty-five owners of the securities within three
years of the completion of the distribution or such other time as the Commission
prescribes". In addition, there can be "no selling or promotional expenses paid or
incurred except for professional services or services other than the solicitation of
investors by a registrant" [20]. Draft statute exemptions for intraprovincial distributions and for securities transactions by issuers having fewer than fifty securityholders are also helpful to small issuers.
The Proposals' draft statute also addresses another problem that has greatly
troubled regulators in both Canada and the United States: the problem of the socalled two-step distribution. This distribution is accomplished by an exempt distribution of securities to a large purchaser who, in turn, resells to persons to whom a
direct distribution would have required a prospectus. In order to catch such transactions, the draft statute includes in the definition of "distribution", "a sale of a
previously issued security purchased from the issuer or an underwriter of the security, other than a security of a reporting issuer that was purchased by the seller one
hundred and eighty days or such other period as the Commission prescribes before
the sale" [21]. The ambit of this provision is widened, however, by the definition
of "underwriter" to include a person who "as principal, purchases... securities in
furtherance of a distribution" [22]. All of this does a more certain job of dealing
with the two-step distribution than the control device which had earlier been employed by regulators in Canada and the United States. This device required the purchaser under the exemption to purchase with "investment intent". However, the
resultant picture under the proposals' draft statute is one of intimidating complexity. And the "in furtherance of" language retains some of the uncertainty of
the old investment intent element [231.
2.2. Continuousdisclosure
The draft statute's provisions concerning continuous disclosure represent a significant development in Canadian securities regulation of this sort. This is because
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they better select which issuers are to be subject to such a scheme; and they offer
useful proposals for the integration of the requirements of the scheme with the distribution regulatory scheme. In their general outline the provisions resemble the
existing provincial regulations on continuous disclosure and the federal business
corporations legislation. Issuers subject to the provisions under the draft statute
must send a.nnual reports to all their securityholders and quarterly reports to all of
them except debt securityholders; issue press releases, subject to confidentiality
provisions, to publicize new developments as they occur; solicit proxies for securityholders' meetings, and include with such solicitations Commission prescribed
information circulars. Insiders of issuers subject to the continuous disclosure provisions must report to the Commission their initial holdings and subsequent changes
in those holdings, subject to a very useful small trade exemption. Persons who make
takeover bids for the equity securities of an issuer subject to the continuous disclosure provisions must structure their bids in certain prescribed ways, and both they
and the directors of the target issuer must supply offerees with information circulars. Continuous disclosure issuers desiring to repurchase their own equity securities
are subject to a regulatory scheme similar to that for takeover bids. All reports to
securityholders, press releases, and information circulars must not only be distributed in accordance with the relevant statutory provisions, but they must also be
filed with the Commission.
The most significant departure in the draft statute's provisions from the provincial and federal provisions is the draft statute's requirement that, upon entry into
the continuous disclosure system, the issuer must file with the Commission a "registration statement", in prescribed form. This form must be updated annually so that
the information contained therein is current as of the end of the issuer's most
recent financial year. Since such documents are most likely to be used directly by
securities professionals, the form should "include 'soft data' such as earnings forecasts and plans for future development, as well as the 'hard' information contained,
for example, in financial statements" [24].
Only so-called reporting issuers are subject to the continuous disclosure scheme.
The term "reporting istuers" is borrowed from the Securities Act, 1978, of Ontario, where it is used for a similar purpose. In the provincial statute an issuer
becomes a reporting issuer, generally speaking, either by virtue of a stock exchange
listing or by the filing of a prospectus or securities exchange takeover bid circular.
The Proposals accept the first criterion but reject the second. They maintain that
the overall criterion should be "the likelihood that an active trading market will
develop [in the issuer's securities] and that securities analysts will follow the security and thus disseminate the infohnation contained in the issuer's file" [25]. It
replaces the filed document qualification with one based on the attainment of three
hundred or more "public securityholders".
Participation in the continuous disclosure scheme carries with it a number of
benefits, expressed by the draft statute in terms of relief from the new issue regulatory scheme. For instance, disclosure requirements for the prospectuses of report-
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ing issuers are expected to be designed by the CSC "to avoid unnecessary repetition
of information previously filed by the issuer" [26]. Furthermore, reporting issuers
that have been registered for at least one year (or for some other prescribed period)
are exempt from the prospectus requirements if they are selling "limited amounts"
of securities in an "open market" and in such a way as not to disturb "orderly
marketing processes" [27].
It may be argued against the continuous disclosure scheme set forth in the Proposals that it flies in the face of data that support the hypothesis that the market
prices of actively traded securities already impound all the available useful data on
the issuer [28]. It may be that mandated disclosure adds nothing, or at least not
enough to warrant its cost, because issuers have a self-interest in full and accurate
disclosure, the securities professionals following the issuer are ferreting out data in
any event, and the trading patterns of insiders may be providing additional signals
to the market [29]. The Proposals address these data by emphasizing that, especially in Canada, they do not unequivocally support the hypothesis [30]. The Proposals do not consider, at least explicitly, the point that the emphasis in the literature on active trading markets might be drawn on to support the positions the Proposals take on the applicability of the continuous disclosure scheme, and on its
integration with the new issue scheme. That is to say, investor protection accomplished by means of mandated and filed disclosure would seem to presuppose a
"following" in the developing market sufficient to ensure effective use of the information thus provided.
3. Securities market provisions
Turning to the other regulatory area of the draft statute, perhaps the main part
is that dealing with the licensing of securities market professionals, to which is allied
the part dealing with their self-regulatory organizations. Separately discussed are
the provisions of the draft statute dealing with securities clearance, settlement and
transfer systems, and regulation of securities market behavior generally.
3.1. Regulation of market actorsand self-regulatory organizations
The licensing of securities market professionals has long been an important element in securities regulation in Canada. The Proposalsaccept as the objectives of
such licensing requirements that securities professionals should be competent,
honest, and financially responsible. Provincial legislation achieves these objectives
by requiring every person who trades in a security, and who cannot qualify under
an exemption, to be licensed by the appropriate regulatory authority. Such a regulatory authority typically is given very broad discretion both at the point of initial
licensing and in relation to the authority's powers to discipline, and if necessary, to
revoke licenses [31]. The Proposalsfollow a similar pattern, but with some significant variations.
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Perhaps the most significant variation is that the Proposalseliminate the necessity under the provincial schemes for a non-professional to search for an exemption
from the licensing requirement. They do this by requiring only those "who carry on
[an interprovincial] business as a broker or dealer" or as an "adviser" to be registerdd as such. Similarly, they require in the same section registration of a person
who "acts as an underwriter" [32]. With respect to the latter, there is no "carrying
on business" criterion because the definition of "underwriter" limits the requirement "in most cases" [33] to those engaged in the underwriting business; the
exceptional case of the person who acts as a professional underwriter would act,
but is not part of a business, is regulated as if he were an underwriter. The concern
in this situation appears to be to bolster the draft statute's controls of two-step
distributions.
One result of this change in focus of the Proposals'licensing requirement is that
a non-professional is no longer compelled, as he is under the provincial legislation,
to deal through a licensed professional in order to qualify for an exemption from
the licensing requirement. However, in the course of departing from the provincial
models, in which the prospectus exemptions are largely duplicated in the licensing
exemptions, the draft statute has also narrowed the exemptions from its licensing
requirement. Consequently, specialization in prospectus exempt transactions will
not always exempt the practitioner from the need to be licensed. Given the likelihood that inexperienced investors will seek some sort of professional assistance in
most securities transactions, and given the pattern of the statute's exemptions,
there is no real loss of investor protection; quite possibly, there is some gain. The
Proposals' point on this area makes excellent sense: insufficient attention appears
to have been paid in the provincial schemes to the question of whether the protection of having the professionals involved licensed is inappropriate whenever prospectus regulation is considered to be so [34].
Historically in Canada, largely in relation to the member firms of stock
exchanges, a considerable part of the responsibility for supervision of licensed professionals has been left for quite sound pragmatic reasons to self-regulatory organizations. However, the provincial legislation has not fully recognized this state of
affairs; nor has it fully recognized the need to reserve to the securities regulatory
agencies power to supervise the work of such organizations. 'The draft statute contains a set of integrated provisions which represent a significant improvement on
the provincial models. In place of the provincial piecemeal approach which applies
a coherent registration and continuing supervision scheme only to the stock
exchanges, the draft statute requires registration of "any securities exchange",
"clearing agency", or p6rson who carries on activities "as an association of securities firms" [35]. Also, unlike the provincial models, the draft statute goes on to
spell out in some detail the criteria that the Canadian Securities Commission is to
use in determining who must be registered. These criteria are aimed at ensuring that
the applicant has by-laws that advance the purposes of the draft statute, deal fairly
with present and prospective members and with those using its facilities, and do not
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unduly restrain competition. Once the organization is registered the CSC can delegate to it the administration or enforcement of any provision of the statute; the
CSC can then also allocate appropriate authority among such organizations in order
to avoid "unnecessary duplication" [361. The Commission is empowered to continue supervision over such organizations and their decisions, to be sure that standards similar to those for past registration continue to be met.
Notable in all of this is the explicit direction in the statute that the Commission
direct its attention not only to investor protection but also to potential anti-competitive aspects of the operations of self-regulatory organizations. In light of the tone
of one recent Ontario Securities Commission decision permitting the country's
largest stock exchange, the Toronto Stock Exchange, to continue with fixed commission rates for brokerage businesses [37], it appears that there is considerable
virtue in Canada to a forthright statutory direction of that sort.
3.2. Regulation of clearance,settlement, and transfersystems
This part of the draft statute has no equivalent in existing provincial securities
laws, or in any provincial laws. Its provisions are designed to facilitate the existing
trend in Canada toward a system of deposited ("immobilized") security certificates,
as well as certificateless securities issues, with transfers to occur through book
entries with the depositary or clearing agency. The movement is a national one and
is expected to culminate in a single nationwide clearing agency or network of clearing agencies that reflect the national character of the securities markets in this
country.
The draft statute is facultative in that it expressly permits an issuer to immobilize newly issued securities certificates with a registered clearing agency, or to bypass a certificate altogether in favor of issue by book entry in its own records and
those of the clearing agency, provided that the authorization of the beneficial
owner is obtained and that certain documentary and recording formalities are observed. Present provincial corporations laws provide no such stamp of legitimacy for
a certificateless issue and transfer system. The present approximation of it is
erected on the foundation of "complex multi-party contracts" [38].
Once securities have entered the registered clearing agency system they become
subject to the draft statutes legal regime for the transfer and protection of third
interests (like those of a pledgee) in securities. This regime analogizes entries in the
clearing agdncy records (showing matching changes in its participant's holdings) to
delivery of a security certificate in bearer form from one participant to another.
The issuer's method of communication with the beneficial holders of its securities is
provided for. Provisions concerning access to and rectification of a clearing agency's
records are included, as are provisions dealing with the exercise of control over a
participant's account by a beneficial owner, pledgee, or judgment creditor. The
liability of the clearing agency in the case of incorrect entries is described and withdrawal of securities from the clearing agency is permitted. Immobilization of certificates held by certain kinds of institutional intermediaries is also allowed for.
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3.3. Regulation of the securitiesmarket
The Proposalsset forth general rules of market conduct which for the most part
prescribe standards of fair dealing by registrants with clients; the draft statute also
proscribes various forms of fraudulent and manipulative conduct. With respect to
the former, the draft statute innovates upon existing provincial legislation; with
respect to the latter, it presents a new body of law. Presently, provincial law contains fairly limited anti-fraud rules (typically, a prohibition against false statements
in filings), and the federal Criminal Code contains a number of others [39]. The
provisions in the draft statute are intended to replace those in the Criminal Code,
and they considerably supplement the anti-fraud prohibitions of the provincial law.
The draft statute goes even further beyond existing provincial law by making the
anti-fraud prohibitions the basis for later schemes of both civil and criminal liability, following in this respect the model of the ALI Code.
The principal objective of the fraud and manipulation proscriptions is to prohibit all "the fraudulent and similar improper activities that may affect an investor's
decision-making" [40]. A fairly complete array of types of securities fraud, as identified by Canadian and United States securities laws, is included in the draft statute:
insider trading and tipping; short selling and trading in puts and calls by insiders;
representations of regulatory agency endorsement of a security; touting a security;
wash trading; bucketing; churning; manipulation by trading; and short tendering. In
addition, there is a residual provision similar to SEC Rule lOb-5 which prohibits a
person from "engaging in deception [or making] a misrepresentation in connection
with" securities trading or an inducement not to trade, in circularization of securityholders, a takeover bid, a filing or document required to be kept or sent to any
person under the statute, or any kind of public announcement relating to an issuer
"that is likely to induce a person to trade or not to trade a security" [41]. In its
breadth of application it is probably better calculated than its Canadian statutory
forebears to deal with the uncataloguable range of possibilities for securities market
fraud.
4. Enforcement of the draft statute
Under this heading there have been grouped the draft 9tatute's provisions for
civil liability, for administrative action by the CSC, and for criminal liability. Of
these, perhaps the most significant from a domestic viewpoint are the civil liability
rules.
The draft statutes provisions on civil liability are modeled for the most part
after the Al Code. This is not to say that there are no provincial civil liability
rules: there are, in relation to false statements in prospectuses and takeover circulars, insider trading, and failure to deliver prospectuses to the intended recipient as
required by the law. There are matching provisions in the draft statute which draw
on the provincial precedents as well as the corresponding Code provisions, while
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adding some innovations of their own. However, the draft statute goes beyond the
provincial precedents along two trails blazed by the ALL Code. First, it sets up
express rules of civil liability with respect to continuous disclosure documents as
well as market manipulation, breaches of the proxy solicitation and takeover bid
requirements, and a number of other comparatively less significant matters. Second,
it has a residual provision expressly authorizing courts to imply civil liability in
cases of violation of a provision of the statute, a regulation promulgated pursuant
to it, or a by-law of a self-regulatory organization. Additional provisions, inspired
by the United States experience, deal with the liability of aiders and abetters and a
registrant's failure to supervise a person who violated a provision of the statute.
It remains to be seen whether legislation like the draft statute will move civil
liability to the sort of prominence in the enforcement of the securities laws that it
has assumed in the United States. Canada's provincial common law civil procedure
rules in the areas of class actions and costs are far less hospitable to large-scale securities litigation than those in the United States, although the trend seems to be to
narrow the gap [42]. Although the draft statute does not address the procedural
issues, it does address some of the problems that the securities litigation explosion
in the United States has thrown up. In particular, it deals with the problem of
bankrupting civil liability in the context of open market dealings; this is especially
significant for any regime of civil liability that covers continuous disclosure documents. With respect to liability for negligent mis-statements in the annually updated
registration statements of reporting issuers, the statute adopts the ALI Code solution of a more or less arbitrary per misrepresentation damages ceiling. The problem
of perhaps too free-wheeling an implication of civil liability under a provision like
Rule 1Ob-5 is also relevant to the draft statute because of its previously mentioned
broad anti-fraud proscription and license to imply causes of action. The statute
guards against the dangers of a crazy-quilt pattern of implied liability overlapping
and possibly undermining the carefully defined express civil liability rules: it frames
the license in limited terms and enumerates the considerations that the courts must
take into account. To the extent that there are any other potential problems of
excessive implication which the draft statute provision does not address, some comfort may be drawn from the fact that the Anglo-Canadian courts traditionally display a conservative approach to implication of actions based on breach of statute.
It was primarily to overcome the excesses of the approach, and not to restrain the
courts, that the draft statute provisions enumerating examples of fraud were
included. Some relief from the traditional attitude is expected, especially in light of
the direct bridge to the United States experience which the draft statute provides.
But intelligent use of that same bridge in conjunction with the kernel of good sense
inherent in the traditional attitude should prevent the worst of the potential problems.
The draft statute provides for enforcement methods in addition to civil liability.
These resemble the methods enumerated in the provincial securities legislation. The
Canadian Securities Commission is granted power to conduct investigations subject
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to a number of protections for those being investigated. It is empowered to order
cessation of trading in securities generally and in connection with distributions; it
may also issue similar orders with respect to particular individuals the Commission
believes are violating the law. This power is also subject to a number of protections
for those most directly affected. The Commission may prohibit a person from
dealing with any property under his/her control, and may prohibit others from
dealing with property held for him/her. The Commission may seek a court order
directing compliance with the law or appointment of a receiver, or permitting the
bringing of an action under the statute on behalf of an issuer or securityholder, or
intervening in an action under the statute. Criminal liability for breach of the statute's scheme is also provided for, with penalties graded according to the seriousness of the offense; the defendant may assert a defense of reasonable reliance on
opinion of counsel.

5. Administration of the draft statute
In accordance with the Canadian-United States model, the draft statute sets up
a regulatory agency, the Canadian Securities Commission, with responsibility for
administration of the statute and with considerable discretionary power to elaborate the detail and to some extent change the contours of the regulatory scheme.
On its face, the statute goes considerably beyond the provincial models in its institutional prescriptions for "open and fair" decision-making by the CSC [43]. In particular, unlike the provincial legislation it states that in the exercise of its powers to
formulate delegated legislation, the CSC is required to give notice of its proposals,
to afford interested parties an opportunity to make representations, and to describe
the basis and purpose of the proposals and the final product. Judicial review not
only of CSC decisions in particular cases but also CSC regulations is provided for.
Such prescriptions do n6t go far beyond the provincial practice in these areas; however, what is novel is the elevation of these matters to the level of statutory provision.
One important role the CSC will play, which by its nature has no counterpart in
the provincial legislation, is that of an important component of the Proposals'
mechanism for coordinating the federal regulatory scheme with the provincial
schemes. A number of substantive provisions designed to prevent undesirable overlap have already been mentioned in passing: restriction of the distribution regulatory scheme by exclusion of distributions "where all of the sales are made in the
same province" [44]; restriction of the licensing scheme by exclusion therefrom of
persons who carry on business as brokers, dealers, or advisers, or of persons who act
as underwriters "only in one province" [45]; and the general provision in the draft
statute excluding its application "to a trade that is initiated and completed in a
single province otherwise than through the facilities of a registered securities
exchange" [46].
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In addition to these substantive exclusions, there are a number of provisions that
direct the CSC to cover cases where federal and provincial regulation overlap. The
CSC is required to issue a receipt for a prospectus that has already been approved
by a provincial agency, although the CSC may impose on its acceptance a condition
limiting distribution to the province concerned. There is a matching provision that
relates to the licensing of securities market actors. The CSC is authorized to invite
provincial personnel to participate as commissioners in its decision-making; and it is
authorized to delegate almost any of its functions to, and accept any delegation of
any of the functions of, a provincial agency pursuant to an agreement between the
Government of Canada and the province concerned. Finally, the CSC is exhorted
by the draft statute to "cooperate" with the provincial authorities "in order to minimize duplication of effort and maximize the protection afforded investors in
Canada" [47].

6. Conclusion
There can be no doubt that the Proposals represent a tour de force. All the
major component parts of the regulatory scheme show the benefits of the long and
thoughtful gestation period that the Proposalsunderwent.
In the new issue regulation area, as elsewhere, the draft statute draws carefully
on the products of the recent wave of securities reform in Canada and the United
States. While the prospectus requirement has benefited from the deletion of the old
requirement of public purchasers, it has not eliminated the other major source of
interpretive uncertainty in the provincial legislation engendered by the desire to
control two-step distributions. Perhaps the major achievement of the draft statute is
its further rationalization of the intricate network of exemptions which clearly differentiates the Canadian prospectus requirement from the present or proposed
United States requirement.
In the other area of greatest interest to issuers, i.e. continuous disclosure, the
draft statute again shows the benefit of a lengthy period spent distilling the best of
the Canadian-United States experience. In the restriction of the scheme to issuers
for which the development of a significant professional following is most likely, the
draft statute can be argued to have laid a better basis for the resulting burden and
benefit than the provincial legislation. Additionally, the draft statute contains some
eminently sensible provisions for the integration of the new issue and continuous
disclosure schemes of regulation.
In the other areas of draft statute regulation canvassed in this review, further
thought-provoking variations from the Canadian provincial models were noticed. In
the area of licensing, the draft statute has a much more finely tuned requirement
than the one in the provincial legislation. Similarly, in the area of self-regulation, a
more coherent regulatory scheme appears in the draft statute than in the provincial legislation. In the area of clearance settlement and transfer systems the statute
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has a set of provisions largely without parallel in provincial securities or other law.
And with respect to direct regulation of conduct in the securities markets, there is
a potentially useful general anti-fraud provision in the draft statute that is not
found in the provincial schemes.
In its provisions that are ancillary to the regulatory schemes it sets up, the draft
act continues in the same vein. A much more comprehensive network of civil liability rules appears there than in the provincial legislation. This network might, at
least after some experience is gained with it, move civil liability into greater significance as an enforcement device in Canada than such liability has traditionally
enjoyed. In relation to enforcement through other means, the draft act offers no
changes of matching significance from the provincial models it follows. But it does
offer some useful points of departure in details. Finally, in its prescriptions for the
administrative agency set up to administer and to some extent make adaptive
changes to the regulatory schemes, the draft act offers a set of legislative endorsements of the solutions concerning the powers of such agencies in the provincial
sphere which now appear to be in place.
No matter how well thought out its provisions nor how extensive the allowance
which it has been seen it makes for the coordination of its schemes of regulation
with provincial law, the draft statute's enactment into law is hardly a foregone conclusion. Apart from any question of federal government policy, the likely political
"sticking point" is the significant federal presence in what has traditionally been an
area of almost exclusive provincial control that the statute represents. However, it
must be admitted that it is impossible to be sure in which direction Canada's constitutional arrangements in the area of division of responsibilities will go in the
present unsettled state of federal-provincial relations. And it may be that a major
financial catastrophe may radically transform the political climate.
In the final analysis, it is easiest to be sure about the Proposals'place in securities law scholarship in Canada and in the store of useful regulatory ideas for the
provinces to draw .on. That place is a very significant one. Indeed, the ideas are
worthy of study not only in Canada, but in all countries for which securities regulation is a concern.
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